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designed to pursue the "legitimate national, state, and community interest in
maintaining a decent society." See United
States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, 54
(D.C.App., 1975).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently found the opportunity to
consider this statute again in reviewing
the conviction of Diane Dinkins. Dinkins
v. United States, 374 A.2d 292 (D.C.
App., 1977). In affirming this conviction,
the court, sitting en bane, arrived at a
construction of the statute which
broadens considerably its reach and which
some have found to be outrageous.
Diane Dinkins was standing on a corner
in Washington, nattily attired in a red
sweater, blue miniskirt, and knee length
boots. Obviously impressed by Diane's
sartorial display, a plain clothes police
officer who had been cruising the area in
his private car pulled near the sidewalk
where Ms. Dinkins was standing. The
officer rolled down his window and said
"Hi" to Ms. Dinkins, who thereupon approached the car. A conversation ensued
which consisted of typically loaded questions from the police officer and typically
suggestive responses from Ms. Dinkins.
The officer first asked how much the
lady's services would be, and when Ms.
Dinkins finally became explicit as to her
repertoire, she was arrested. After her
conviction in a bench trial, she appealed
to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. A division of this court decided to
reverse the conviction. After the panel's
opinion wa~ circulated to the other judges
on the court, the usual practice, a rehearing en bane was scheduled, and the full
court affirmed.
The appellant claimed that "no solictitation [was] made for prostitution since
Miss Dinkins conduct was responsive ...
rather than [initiatory]." 374 A.2d at
295.
The court disagreed, and in analyzing
the wording of the statute noted that the
word solicif does not specifically appear
and thus its directive-active connotation
as a gravamen of the offense was not applicable to §22-2701. 374 A.2d at 295.
Instead, the court indicated (after research
in Webster's Third New International Dictionary) that words such as "entice" and
"address" which are present in §22-2701
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can describe conduct which is not necessarily active nor initiative in tenor.
Through this analysis, which rivals the
medieval philosophical speculation of the
number of angels on the head of a pin,
conduct which is responsive and even
passive in reaction to a reasonably clever
police officer can be proscribed by law.
The court stated its conclusion as
follows:
We hold that appellant's attire, her
prolonged presence on the street corner, her approach to a complete
stranger, her extremely suggestive verbal responses to the officer, her prompt
discussion of financial terms, and her
ready arrangement for a room are
legally sufficient, when taken together,
for a fact finder to conclude guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 374 A.2d
at 296.
The dissenting opinions noted that the
Court of Appeals has interpreted the law
as a solicitation statute. Id. at 297. The
gist of the dissent was that "it must be
affirmatively demonstrated that [she] invited, enticed, persuaded, or addressed
. . . for purposes of prostitution." Id. at
298 (emphasis in original). The minority
indicated that the police officer's remarks
themselves could well be taken to constitute violations of §22-2701. Id.
The second dissenting opinion stated:
I had always thought that if a prostitute
is merely standing on a corner she may
not be convicted of [a violation] of this
statute simply because she is a prostitute. Only if she solicits for prostitution
may a conviction follow. I would have
thought a construction of the statute
was that simple, but now it seems that
it is not. 374 A.2d at 299.

In Basch v. George Washington University, 370 A.2d 1364 (D.C.App., 1977),
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
considered a claim by plaintiff medical
students that the defendant university
breached its contract with them by charging tuition increases far exceeding those
listed in the medical school bulletin.
The George Washington University
Bulletin: School of Medicine and Health
Sciences, published for the 1974-1975
year, listed estimated tuition increases of
approximately $200.00 per year over the
base tuition of $3200.00 for 1974-1975.
Many students, according to appellants/plaintiffs, contended that their
decision to attend George Washington
was influenced by these estimated costs.
When the university issued a "Statement
of Tuition Rates" in January, 1975,
revealing tuition costs far in excess of
those outlined as estimates by the
bulletin, the students complained in a suit
in D.C. Superior Court. Treating a defendant's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, the trial court found that
as a matter of law the students were not
entitled to relief. The case was taken to
the Court of Appeals .
The issue before the court was whether
the university was to be contractually
bound to projected tuition increases. The
appellants renewed their claim that it was.
Considering the fact that medical school
tuition costs in the District have reached,
or will reach $12,000 per year at George
Washington and Georgetown universities,
this claim on the part of the students was
certainly an urgent one.
The court began its discussion by noting the general rule that terms set down in
a university bulletin can become part of
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the contractual relationship between the
university and its students. 370 A.2d at
1366. The court indicated, however, that
bulletin listings of projected tuition increases does not support finding a contractual obligation. [d. This examination
must be made in light of principles of contract interpretation.
This construction must be made with
an eye to the circumstances and to the intent of the parties. Terms of the document
are to be given their common meaning.
[d. at 1367. The court quoted from the
RESTATMENT OF CONTRACTS §32 (1932):
An offer must be so definite in its
terms, or require such definite terms in
the acceptance, that the promises and
performances to be rendered by each
party are reasonably certain.
Viewing the language of the Bulletin as
a whole, and with a reasonable view
toward the language surrounding the
remarks concerning tuition costs, the
court stated that" [tl hese words expressed
an expectancy by the University regarding
future increases. This is not a promise
susceptible of enforcement." 370 A.2d at
1368.
In essence, the court found that the
university attempted to provide rational
guidelines for tuition costs. It had not intended to create an inflexible obligation
on its part to maintain fixed tuition rates
when the economic realities of operating a
university medical school would defeat
that attempt at price stability, and force
the school to operate at a loss. Such an
unknown economic variable did arrive on
the scene when the federal government all
but eliminated. its support for medical/health educational programs in Washington by a decrease in funding through
the District of Columbia Medical and Dental Manpower Act.
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When tort law assigns to an institution
liability for the injurious acts of an indiVidual, the role of the law of civil accountability as social engineering
becomes especially clear. An important
legal concept which assists this function is
the theory of respondeat superior, where
an entity actually remote from the transaction resulting in injury is held responSible because the acting defendant is, or appears to be, the agent of the party
ultimately liable.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently considered the liability of the
remote principal founded on apparent
agency, but in reversing a judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals, refused to
assign responsibility beyond the immediate parties to the event. B.P. Oil Corporation v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d
554 (1977).
Claude Mabe drove into a service station because his car was low on fuel and
water. He asked the attendant for water to
fill the radiator, and the employee produced a can filled with a volatile liquid.
When Mabe poured this into the hot
radiator there was an explosion. Mabe was
injured, and he sued.
The gas station was adorned with British Petroleum insignia: uniforms, gas
pumps, a station vehicle, and a large sign
exhibiting the BP letters and colors. Mabe
had entered the station because he " ...
always buy[sl BP gasoline, always deal[sl
with BP." 279 Md. at 636, 370 A.2d at
557. He therefore decided to deal with BP
in court too, and named the corporation
as a defendant, claiming that the injuries
"stemmed directly from the negligent and
tortious conduct of the defendants and
their agents ... " 279 Md. at 634, 370
A.2d, at 556.

The jury returned a verdict for Mabe.
As consumers they were apparently convinced that Mabe's reliance on the ample
exhibition of BP insignia as indicative of
good products and service meant that he
thought he had entered a station under
the competent direction of the defendant
corporation. The trial court, however, entered a judgment n.o.v., "finding 'no
agency of any kind .... " 279 Md. at 634,
370 A.2d at 556. The Court of Special
Appeals reversed, finding there was agency by estoppel. Mabe v. B.P. Oil Corporation, 31 Md.App. 221, 356 A.2d 304
(1976). (See The FORUM, Vol. VII, No.
2, p. 26)
After granting certiorari, the Court of
Appeals examined two theories of action:
actual and apparent agency. In considering the former, it found that the owner of
the station, Faison, leased the premises
from a third party, further leased the station to B.P. which in turn, by a reciprocal
agreement, leased it back to Faison. The

rents between B.P. and Faison were contingent on the amount of gasoline sold,
payment for such fuel being the actual
rental fee. Other facts dispositive of the
actual agency theory were the lack of salary and commission from B.P., and absence of control by the corporation in the
hiring and payment of the station's
employees. lt was found that Faison controlled the operation of the station and
that B.P.'s role was limited to that of selling its products to Mabe (and only when
he was able to pay for them).
The court concluded that there was no
direct control by B.P. over the operation

